INTRODUCTION
Fair division is a fundamental issue of legal policy. The law of remedies specifies damages and rules of contribution that apportion liability among multiple defendants. 1 allocation. 7 For some public projects the government apportions the cost of the projects among users. 8 Despite the importance of this issue, law professors have largely ignored 9 a small, but flourishing, band of economic theorists who study questions of fair division.
10
In this book review I suggest a starting point for such analysis.
Hervé Moulin, the author of Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction, 11 and H. Peyton Young, the author of Equity: In Theory and Practice, 12 are two of the economic theorists working to move the study of fairness into the mainstream of economic analysis. In the introduction to his book, Moulin laments: "To the majority of economists today, the ethical choices of distributive justice are alien to economic analysis….The standard view simply incorporates … concerns about justice (distributive and otherwise) in the description of individual characteristics: some of us derive utility from giving to the needy, some of us do not." 13 It is no surprise that fairness does not play a significant role in law and economics since it does not play much of a role in any area of 7 applied economics. 14 I hope my review of these two books will pique some interest in this subject and promote legal scholarship that incorporates fairness into the economic analysis of law.
See generally

15
The main topic of the two books is the microeconomic analysis of methods for fairly allocating benefit and cost. The authors are eclectic and do not insist on a single preferred mode of fairness analysis. Moulin advocates a three-pronged approach that combines some notion of end-state justice with procedural requirements related to voluntary participation and voluntary disclosure of personal information. 16 Young also discusses procedural and end-state justice in various economic models, but does not suggest a unified theory. 17 In both books, procedural questions are subsidiary to end-state questions. Procedure is usually studied in the following terms: Given method X achieves desirable results in terms of end-state justice, can we find a way to implement X that 14 See generally EDWARD ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 76 (1995) (noting that economists split efficiency from fairness analysis and leave the consideration of fairness to policy-makers). 15 My Westlaw search found no citations to the book by Moulin (1998) . I frequently attend meetings of the American Law and Economic Association and I have never witnessed a presentation that used the cooperative microeconomic analysis that I will describe in this book review. 16 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 3 ("I submit that cooperation between selfish economic agents can be conceived in three fundamental "modes," namely, direct agreement, justice, and decentralized behavior.") He also contends that an ideal cooperative mechanism should be just, stable, and implementable via a unique equilibrium. Id. at 4. 17 Young argues that allocation methods tend to follow one of three conceptions of fairness (he uses the term equity): parity, proportionality, or priority. See YOUNG, supra note 12 at 8. Parity corresponds to equal treatments of equals. Priority is invoked as the fair way to address the allocation of indivisible goods. The good is given to the party with the highest priority based on some measure of merit. See id.
allows the affected parties to participate voluntarily, subject to reasonable constraints on the government's behavior? 18 As in Moulin and Young, most of my comments in this review concern end-state justice. The two simple allocation methods that serve as the starting point for the analysis of end-state justice find their origin in the Aristotelian theory of distributive justice: equal cost (or benefit) sharing and proportional cost (or benefit) sharing. 19 Consider the following illustration. A man wins the lottery and decides to make a gift of $1 million to his divorced parents. He could choose equality and give one-half million dollars to each, or he could choose proportionality and give $600,000 to his mother in recognition that her life expectancy is fifty percent longer.
Moulin and Young consider many variations on both themes and insist that there
is no single fair method of division. Each new context demands a new analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of different methods. For example, if we change the context of the son's fair division problem by awarding him a car rather than cash in the lottery, his new division problem is more difficult. The car is not divisible. He might sell the car and divide the proceeds as above. But that approach is not always acceptable. No market exists for some items, such as organs available for transplant. 20 Furthermore, the market may not capture the idiosyncratic valuation of an item. 21 Suppose that the car is a 18 Fair process is discussed in Part V. 19 According to Aristotle, equal treatment is required when individuals are the same in terms of merit or blame. When individuals differ in a morally relevant way (for example, some work harder, or some are more costly to serve) then benefit or cost should be allocated in proportion to some factor that captures the difference. (1996) . The other main strand of economic theory related to fairness arises from the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. See e.g., VARIAN, supra note 25, at 198-203. The First Theorem provides conditions under which a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. The Second Theorem states that any competitive equilibrium can be implemented by the proper specification of property rights. Law and economics scholars rely on the Second Theorem to justify legal analysis that bifurcates efficiency and fairness analysis of the law. The usual attitude is that law should be shaped by efficiency concerns, and the legislature can achieve fairness through taxation and spending policies. See infra text at Part IV. I will justify the local analysis of justice developed by Young and Moulin below by arguing that the usual appeals to the Second Theorem are unpersuasive in terms of microeconomics and in terms of political economy. Furthermore, I argue that fairness depends on more than the distribution of income. Economic analysis of the law needs to pay attention to fairness concerns that arise when all of the parties affected by a law have similar income and wealth, but differ in other morally significant dimensions. 29 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at xi. 30 Id. at 6. often compartmentalized; there are few chances for compensation across different problems of fair division.
31
In this review I intend to introduce the reader to some valuable tools for analyzing concrete problems of distributive justice. The tools are found in cooperative microeconomics; especially cooperative game theory. I will illustrate the value of these tools by showing how they can be applied to legal policy issues. I hope to convince the reader that these methods deserve greater attention in the practice of law and economics.
There are at least three roles for fairness analysis in law and economics:
32 (1) 52 See id., at 12-13 (rejecting utilitarianism in the sense of comparing people's happiness but says that interpersonal comparisons must be made). 53 See id. note, at 85; MOULIN, supra note 12, at 402-427; MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 127-130 (1982) . bidders gathered and held a series of private (and illegal) auctions open only to ring members to allocate the machinery won by the collusive ring and to allocate the financial gains derived at the expense of the auctioneer. These private auctions were designed in such a way that the collusive gain was allocated to ring members according to the Shapley value.
60
The nucleolus is a generalization of the contested garment rule that appears in the Talmud as a rule for fair division. 61 The contested garment rule first appears in the Zack with probability (1/6) and pays 100 (because Zack has already paid 300). These observations allow us to calculate that the Shapley value allocation for Yves is 116(2/3).
66
The Shapley value allocation for Xerxes is 66(2/3) and for Zack it is 216(2/3).
In contrast, the nucleolus yields a payment of 50 by Xerxes, a payment of 125 by
Yves, and a payment of 225 by Zack. This is the allocation that minimizes the dissatisfaction (in this case, it is easier to think of maximizing satisfaction) of the various Thus each of the least satisfied coalitions have the same complaint -they got a surplus of just 50. But there is no way to shift the payments to give every coalition a surplus above 50. Consider that a smaller payment by Xerxes would lead to a higher combined payment by Yves and Zack -with the result being the surplus of {Y,Z} would fall below 50.
Likewise, raising the surplus to {Y,Z} would necessarily reduce the surplus to Xerxes.
Notice that the Shapley value is not equivalent to the nucleolus because Xerxes gets a surplus of only 33(1/3) from the Shapley value allocation.
65 I use c( ) rather than v( ) to indicate that a cost not a value is associated with each coalition. 66 (1/3 x 200) + (1/3 x 0) + (1/6 x 200) + (1/6 x 100).
I do not want to pause yet to compare the merits of the two solutions. It is not obvious that either apportionment of damages is fairer. The purpose of the example was to illustrate how the solution concepts are applied. I will move to a more detailed example drawn from nuisance law to set the stage for a normative evaluation of the two solution concepts.
The private nuisance problem is a perennial concern in law and economics. 67 The standard analysis was fashioned by Coase, who observed that parties can bargain to eliminate inefficiencies associated with conflicting uses on neighboring property. 68 The
Coase Theorem states that parties will negotiate the efficient solution to a private nuisance problem if transaction costs are low. 69 Further, the solution is independent of the assignment of property rights. To make the problem concrete I suppose that the benefit to Ann from her activity is 4. Similarly, the benefit to Bob and Carol from their activities if they are disturbed by 67 See e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 61-67. 68 See Coase, supra note 34. 69 Id.
Ann is 4 each. If Bob and Carol are undisturbed, then their benefit rises to 6 each. Ann's net benefit falls to 3 if she modifies her activity so that it does not disturb Bob and Carol. This is enough data to specify a cooperative game and find a solution.
71
The traditional Coasean argument in law and economics holds that rights should be assigned in a way that maximizes efficiency. Here, efficiency requires that Ann refrain from the activity that diminishes the benefits available to Bob and Carol. If transaction costs are low, it does not matter how the rights are assigned, because the parties will negotiate that outcome. Where transaction costs are high, however, the Coasean argument favors assignment of rights to Bob and Carol. In the following discussion, I assume that transaction costs are sufficiently low so that efficiency will be achieved regardless of how property rights are assigned. Ann forbears from polluting, she offers a significant benefit to either Bob or Carol or the pair, and the Shapley value recognizes that contribution by rewarding her.
It may seem that the Shapley value solution is somehow stacked in favor of the polluter. In fact, it is. The problem, though, is not with the Shapley value solution concept; rather, it lies in my specification of the characteristic function. While my specification was reasonable, it is not the only reasonable specification. I will now revise (ACB or CAB) the marginal contribution is 6. Thus, the Shapley value for B is: (1/6)4 + (1/6)4 + (1/6) 5 + (1/6)4 + (1/6)6 + (1/6)6 = 4(5/6). 75 Bob and Carol both get a benefit of 2 while Ann loses 1.
the characteristic function and recalculate the Shapley value. The result will be a solution that is more favorable to Bob and Carol. It is important to notice that the specification of the characteristic function incorporates significant value judgments.
In the first specification of the characteristic function, I assumed that Ann's polluting activity was a background condition that could affect any coalition. Now I reverse that assumption and suppose that the absence of pollution is the background . 77 Still another interpretation is that in the state of nature Bob and Carol can prevent Ann from choosing the polluting activity by force. 78 Ann makes a marginal contribution of 3 to the singleton coaltion {A}. She makes a marginal contribution of 3 to either doubleton coalition. And she makes a marginal contribution of 3 to the grand coalition. Averaging over all 3's gives an allocation of 3 to Ann. For Bob or Carol, their marginal contributions are 6 to every coalition that they might join, so they each get a Shapley value allocation of 6.
How do we evaluate which of the alternative specifications of the characteristic function is correct? In this setting I think that either can be defended. I might choose a payoff to the singleton coalitions that reflects what each party actually can achieve in isolation. That might mean that Bob gets 6 because he can intimidate Ann until she abates the dust from her gravel pit, turns down her music, or keeps her boat from interfering with the fishing. Of course, the opposite might also be true. Descriptive realism is not necessarily required or desirable. I might specify that v(B) = 6 because Bob deserves a benefit of 6 when he stands alone. Finally, I might specify payoffs to coalitions based on either status quo or hypothetical property rights.
Comparing the Shapley values obtained for the two specifications, we see that Bob and Carol do better under the new specification. The payoffs yielded by the new
Shapley value match the payoffs that result from giving Bob and Carol the right to be free from interference by Ann. The difference between the two specifications is that Ann's marginal contributions are smaller under the new specification because Bob and Carol do better without Ann. 79 Intuitively, the new analysis models the cooperative problem in a way that is more sympathetic to the victims of pollution. As a result, the Shapley value derived from the new specification of the characteristic function gives Bob and Carol a relatively high allocation. Thus, I reiterate the point I made earlier that a critical issue is how the analyst abstracts from the context of the problem. 80 To a large degree, fairness analysis depends on how reference points are chosen. One advantage of this formal approach is that it makes the effect of an analyst's assumption quite clear. 79 Under the new specification Ann contributes 3 to the coalition {A} compared to 4 before, she contributes 3 to the coalitions {A, B} and {A, C} compared to 5 before, and she contributes 3 to the grand coalition {A, B, C} compared to 7 before.
Having just stated that fairness analysis depends on reference points to a large degree, I hasten to add that the choice of solution concept is also very important. The nucleolus is a leading alternative to the Shapley value as a solution concept for cooperative games. In some problems the two solution concepts will give similar outcomes; in other problems they diverge widely. To a large degree, the choice of a solution concept depends on the analyst's moral intuition. Once the analyst understands how different solution concepts work, he or she can make a choice based on which one more closely comports with the analyst's moral intuition.
In Let me explain the derivation of the nucleolus and why the solution concepts diverge for the first specification and agree for the second. The nucleolus creates a rough parity among all coalitions by maximizing satisfaction experienced by each coalition. I judge satisfaction by comparing the payoffs allocated to the members of a coalition by a potential solution to the payoff specified for that coalition by the characteristic function.
For example, the nucleolus associated with the first characteristic function allocates a payoff of 5 to Ann. Her level of satisfaction is the gap between that payoff, and the payoff 80 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 122 (framing effects in bargaining).
given by the characteristic function v(A) = 4. I will say that her satisfaction level is equal A rough version of the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value states: 84 it is the unique allocation rule that is (i) impartial, (ii) Pareto optimal, and (iii) satisfies the marginality principle. Impartiality means that the allocation only depends on the relevant specified information. The allocation cannot depend on factors that are morally arbitrarylike whose name is shorter. Pareto optimality simply means that all benefits are allocated; 82 I am not transgressing my rule against global analysis of fairness issues. I do not mean to suggest that one fairness rule can either answer all questions about a just society or even that one fairness rule is satisfactory for all problems of fair division. Rather, I am suggesting that we should make sure that a fair division method is robust in the sense that it performs well for all plausible division problems in a particular class. 83 
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The essential differences between the Shapley value and the nucleolus can be traced to the difference between the marginality principle used to characterize the former and the consistency principle used to characterize the latter. I will explore the relative merits of the two axioms by explaining how they can be violated. Specifically, I will 85 I will explain this principle further below. 86 See id., at 201-204. 87 The Shapley value satisfies the separability and homogeneity axioms, but they are not needed to characterize the Shapley value. 88 Since a precise definition is difficult to understand, I will illustrate the consistency principle with an example below. is reduced from 300 to 200. 90 The marginal contributions by Xerxes are the same in the 89 The set of players is the same in the two games. 90 In the new game Yves' costs are symmetric with Xerxes' costs. the Shapley value. The Shapley value allocation gives 116(2/3) to both Yves and Yvette, and 183(1/3) to both Zack and Zeke. 95 The consistency principle is violated by the Shapley value as applied to these two fair division problems.
To recapitulate the discussion so far in Part III, the marginality principle and the consistency principle offer alternative axiomatic bases for constituting a rule of fair division. If an analyst finds the marginality principle more attractive, then he or she should choose the Shapley value as a solution concept. If the analyst finds the consistency principle more attractive, then he or she should choose the nucleolus.
I will conclude this part by describing two desirable properties of fair division rules: one property is satisfied only by the Shapley value, and the other is not satisfied by the Shapley value at all.
The first property, which holds only for the Shapley value, is the monotonicity condition. 96 Roughly speaking, when two cooperative games are compared, if the payoffs of all coalitions are greater in the second game than the first, then the payoffs to all players must be greater in the second game. 97 The nucleolus sometimes violates this condition. It is possible that external changes that increase the surplus available to everyone actually reduce some player's nucleolus payoff. Not only does monotonicity seems intuitively desirable, it also has political-economic significance. To the extent that legal policy represents a fair bargain among interest groups, it is desirable that the bargain does not have to be reworked in the face of exogenous social or economic changes. An exogenous change that increases total surplus may reduce some player's nucleolus payoff.
94 Given the characteristic function with v(Y) = 200 and v(Z) = 300. 95 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 71. 96 The marginality principle is the key to assuring that the monotonicity condition is satisfied.
Such an event would provoke demands for revision of the sharing rule to protect the player that suffers. 98 This type of problem is avoided by the Shapley value.
The second desirable property concerns the temptation of coalitions to defect from a joint enterprise. The nucleolus is preferable to the Shapley value on the grounds that the nucleolus is more resistant to threats of defection. The nucleolus is designed to minimize the dissatisfaction of each coalition. It gives every coalition a payoff greater than the coalition's characteristic function payoff -whenever that is possible. 99 The same cannot be said of the Shapley value.
The following example illustrates a problem of defection that afflicts the Shapley value but not the nucleolus. 97 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 200. 98 See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 121-22. 99 An economic concept called the core is useful here. The core is defined to be the set of feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by the objection of some coalition. Any coalition that can do better on its own that it does with a suggested allocation is allowed to object. Intuitively, the core is the set of allocations that are resistant to defection. See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 403-06; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 85. Unfortunately, the core does not exist for all cooperative games. In other words, for some cooperative games, at least one coalition will object to any possible allocation. The nucleolus is especially resistant to defection because it is defined in such a way that it is always in the core if the core exists. See id., at 201-02. 100 For similar examples see MOULIN, supra note 11, at 24-25; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 82-84.
The communities clearly benefit from cooperation since each pair of communities and the coalition of all three communities get benefits that exceed the sum of the benefits when the communities are on their own. The Shapley value allocation for this problem gives a payoff of 2 1 / 3 to community A, and 3 1 / 3 to communities B and C. A weakness of the Shapley value in this setting is that communities B and C could defect from the three community project and get a higher payoff on their own: the Shapley value gives the pair Other examples include international economic and environmental treaties, joint ventures, and partnerships. There is no point embracing an allocation method as fair if some players object to their allocation 102 and actually leave the joint enterprise. 103 In most of 101 The reader should notice that I am mingling normative and positive theory here. Cooperative games and their solutions concern how a group should divide costs or benefits. Whether members of a group can and will defect is a positive question. The link that I am drawing is based on the notion that defection will not occur if every coalition is doing as well under the solution of the game as they could on their own. Economists use the core to examine this link. 102 There is an easy way to defend an allocation as fair even though it is vulnerable to defection. If players view an allocation as fair, then they might remain with a joint venture despite an incentive to defect. In other words, the commitment to participate in a fair venture may outweigh a monetary interest in defection. 103 Notice that defection is not always a problem with the Shapley value. Recall the earlier discussion of the bidder cartel which settled on the Shapley value as a fair way to distribute the gains from collusion. That cartel was remarkably resistant to defection. The important point is that the very construction of the nucleolus assures that coalition dissatisfaction is minimized.
the fair division problems discussed in this review, the allocation is mandated and players do not have an option of leaving the joint enterprise. Nevertheless, there is a normative argument that the nucleolus is desirable because it is consistent with a goal of autonomy since coalitions receive an allocation that is at least as good as what they can achieve on their own (when this is possible). A sensible rejoinder to the autonomy argument is that sometimes it is just for one coalition to subsidize another. The universal service requirement in public utility regulation is a prominent example of a mandated subsidy policy.
IV. FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
Moulin and Young address two main criticisms of the use of cooperative game theory or other notions of end-state justice to guide legal policy-making. The first criticism holds that fair division of cost or benefit ignores economic efficiency. The second criticism holds that fair division should be assessed with reference to procedural rather than end-state justice. The authors are sensitive to both criticisms and believe that end-state analysis must accommodate concerns about efficiency and process. In this part of the Review I will mention some of the highlights of analysis that combines efficiency with end-state justice. In the next part of the Review I will discuss fair process.
Two efficiency issues frequently arise in fair division problems. One is the problem of shirking. I use that term broadly to cover both the free-rider problem 105 and the moral hazard problem. 106 Generally, the issue is whether parties will take private actions that optimally advance a joint project. The other efficiency issue concerns strategic misrepresentation of information by parties holding private information.
107
Self-interested parties usually will not take optimal actions to advance the common good. They tend to shirk their responsibility because they personally bear the cost of effort, resource contribution, or investment in the joint project. The government can eliminate the free-rider problem through coercion, and firms can mitigate or eliminate the problem by building cooperative institutions like joint ventures or trade associations.
Moral hazard can also be eliminated, provided that inefficient actions can be observed and verified. Governmental fiat or private contract can assure efficient action given observability and verifiability. Yet many public goods are provided by the private sector without serious shirking problems. Suppose, for example, three oil companies hire an exploration company to 106 Moral hazard occurs when a person deviates from an agreed course of action and takes an action that advances personal interests. See ZAJAC, supra note 14, at 60-61. 107 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 130-31. 108 Economists apply the term observable to information shared by the parties to a contract. They apply the term verifiable to information shared by the parties and the trier of fact at trial.
investigate oil deposits at a remote site. The companies agree they will share the resulting information. The companies certainly care about the incentive effects of their contract with the exploration company. But efficiency issues recede when it comes to dividing the cost of this simple joint venture. The companies are likely to use some fairness criterion to guide their decision about how they will share the cost of compensating the exploration company. The companies can handle the free-rider problem with a contract that binds them to sharing the compensation cost. Another danger created by the information revelation problem is that the decision whether to build a public project like a dam, and also the size of the project, may be distorted. If users know that their payment for the dam will be proportional to their benefit, then they have an incentive to understate their benefit. If the government believes 110 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 22 and sections 6.4 and 6.5.
the understated valuations, then it could mistakenly decide to cancel a project or reduce its scale because costs appear large in comparison to benefits.
Private information does not always create efficiency problems. 112 Some people will report their private information honestly regardless of the consequences to themselves. Other people are deterred from lying because they fear getting caught and the resulting shame or punishment. Deterrence requires some probability that liars are detected and punished. This is not possible with some kinds of information that cannot be verified in court; e.g., how strongly a person desires a public good. Even when detection is not feasible or effective, sharing rules are another source of incentives for truthtelling.
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In the following example the sharing rule achieves both the fairness and efficiency goals. Consider a public project that will serve Ann, Bob, and Carol. The expected benefits to each party from an optimally designed project are equal. Suppose that there are two design choices: X or Y. Further suppose that there are two possible states of the world: x or y, and that Ann and Bob observe the true state of the world, while Carol and the government manager in charge of the project simply know that x and y are equally likely. Assume that choice X is optimal given x is the true state of the world. Similarly, Y is optimal given y. Finally, assume that Ann prefers project X and Bob prefers project Y regardless of the true state of the world. The problem for the manager is to fairly assign 111 See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. 112 The collusive bidders at the used machinery auction dealt with the information revelation problem effectively. They chose a mechanism that induced the high value party to identify themselves. The mechanism also implemented the Shapley value allocation of the gains from collusion. 116 Young believes that the degree of conflict is overstated, and that fairly assigning entitlements in the context of competitive markets is often the best approach to public policy. 117 Generally, law and economics scholars shy away from a serious analysis of fairness issues when efficiency is a concern. The usual justification is that particular policies can be designed on the basis of efficiency. If the result is an unfair 114 The following numbers can be used to illustrate the example. The cost of the project is 9. The benefit to Carol when the project design matches the state is 9. The benefit to Carol is 0 otherwise. The benefit to Ann is: 10 if the state is x and the design is X; 9 if the state is y and the design is X; 8 if the state is y and the design is Y; and 6 if the state is x and the design is Y. The benefit to Bob is: 8 if the state is x and the design is X; 6 if the state is y and the design is X; 10 if the state is y and the design is Y; and 9 if the state is x and the design is Y. The equilibrium reports of Ann and Bob will be the true state. All three get an expected payoff of 6. 115 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 22 (discussing the tension between efficiency and equity). 116 See id., at 163 (endorses an approach to fair division that defines "reasonable tests of equity, selecting as often as possible a small subset of efficient and 'just' outcomes.") 117 See YOUNG, supra note 12, at 161 (stating the trade-off is "largely chimerical"); id. at 19 (justifying competitive markets with fairly defined entitlements as equitable 119 There are three problems with the usual approach to fairness in law and economics. First, fairness is manifest in dimensions other than wealth or income inequality. I doubt that fiscal policy is the appropriate venue to address fairness issues raised by most of the fair division problems discussed earlier in this review. Second, political reality may favor interventions for the sake of fairness at the level of particular policies rather in the general fiscal policy arena. Third, the claim that fairness can be assured more efficiently through fiscal policy is open to challenge. Id. 120 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 36-44; YOUNG, supra note 12, at 130-45. 121 For an extensive discussion of "cake-cutting" methods that can be used to implement fair outcomes see generally BRAMS AND TAYLOR, supra note 50 (Cake-cutting requires that one party divides resources that will be shared. The other party or parties get first choice among the allotments of resources. The name comes from the just solution parents use to settle distributional fights among children.) See also Moulin, supra note 24, at 2-3, 11-12 (Economists study fair procedure by specifying a game that implements a social choice. The "rights" of a player in the game are modeled as the set of actions available to the player under the rules of the game.) The concept of implementation is explained in KEN BINMORE, FUN AND GAMES: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY 531 (1992).
despite these constraints. Alternatively, economic analysis is used to show what ends are feasible given limited knowledge and power.
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In the second estate division problem I skirted the question of implementation by supposing that the priest knew the valuations that Yves and Zack attached to the painting.
In fact, there is a simple auction process that implements the end-state in which Yves takes the painting and pays $200 to Zack. 123 The priest simply puts the painting up for public auction and lets Yves and Zack split the proceeds. Yves would submit a winning bid of $400, take the painting, and pay half of the winning bid to Zack.
The preceding example shows that sometimes a fair end-state can be implemented despite private information. Closer attention to the example reveals another potential implementation problem: a wealth constraint. If Yves has wealth less than $200, the supposed transfer is not feasible. The outcome of the public auction would be an inefficient sale to a third party, and Yves and Zack would split the proceeds of $400.
A third implementation difficulty is caused by collusion between the players.
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Recall the discussion of the allocation of pollution damages between Xerxes, Yves, and Zack. For heuristic purposes I suggested that the Shapley value could be interpreted in terms of a lottery that determined the order in which the players made payments to satisfy the damage claim. For example, whoever draws the shortest straw makes the first payment. Whoever draws the longest straw makes the last payment (if any payment is still required after the first two). One problem with this lottery approach is that Xerxes and The neighbors are assumed to combine equal cost sharing, a notion of end-state justice, with either majority or unanimity voting as a fair process for eliciting preference information. Although unanimity voting respects a voluntary participation constraint, majority voting is more efficient.
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Moulin illustrates the problem by supposing that the garden gives the neighbors the following benefits in dollars: $800, $600, $450, $350, and $300 for a total value of $2500. The cost of the gardener is $2000, so the project is efficient if the benefits are commensurable and weighted equally. Equal cost sharing of $400 implies that two of the neighbors will suffer a loss. The project will not be undertaken given a unanimous voting rule. Two of the neighbors will object to the project because they would have to pay more than they get. In contrast, the project will be approved using a majority voting rule with equal cost sharing. The vote would be three in favor and two opposed. So majority voting leads to an efficient outcome while unanimity does not.
Majority voting does not always yield efficiency. If the resident holding the value of $450 is assigned a lower value of $350, then an inefficient result occurs. The total property both efficiently and equitably provided the goods were equitably allocated to begin with.") Id. Assuming rationality, people will trade from their initial endowments in a way that makes everyone better off. We see market-like forces in action when children trade food from their school lunch. 134 See MOULIN, supra note 11, at 23-24. 135 See id., at 325. A different approach studied in the same chapter is voluntary contribution to the production of the public good. Like the two voting procedures, voluntary contribution usually leads to inefficiently low levels of production, but it is not systematically lower than the level under the voting procedures. Id. at 339-49.
value of a gardener is now $2400 and the garden's value still exceeds its cost, but a majority of residents now oppose the plan. A possible remedy for this inefficiency is to change the cost sharing rule. In the original problem, if costs are shared proportionally to benefits then the costs are allocated: (640, 480, 360, 280, 240). The neighbors will now unanimously vote for to hire the gardener, if and only if it is efficient to do so. Of course, the allure of the proportional rule fades once we recall that the residents have an incentive to understate their benefit to reduce their cost share.
CONCLUSION
I conclude with brief remarks on a bothersome question: If these books are so valuable for legal scholarship, why aren't they read and cited more often by legal scholars -after all, they were written four and five years ago? There are two plausible answers to that question, but only one that I can accept. First, the methods of cooperative microeconomics are too hard to apply and the results obtained from these methods are too weak to be interesting. Second, this subfield of microeconomic theory is relatively obscure and no one has noticed its potential usefulness in law and economics. Of course, I
favor the second answer.
The purpose of this review was to introduce the methods of cooperative microeconomics to an audience of legal scholars. The task was fairly easy because so many of the canonical problems studied by Moulin and Young are directly relevant to legal policy. The examples I have presented in this Review are certainly accessible to non-economists and at the same time they offer rich insights into problems of fair division. With a nascent interest in fairness appearing in law and economics the time is ripe to apply cooperative game theory and other methods from cooperative microeconomics to the study of legal policy.
rule might create bad incentives).
